

ARDA

Clarke Plan

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" " Justice "

" " FBI "

DOJ Review Completed.

FBI Review completed

Not referred to OMB. Waiver
applies.

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Dear Tom:

Mr. Smith and I have given a great deal of thought to the proposal contained in your memorandum "U.S. Secret World-Wide Intelligence Coverage."

The memorandum emphasizes the similarity of the proposal to the "time-proved program" as carried on in South America. It seems to us that the use of the South American experience alone as a basis for a world-wide operation overlooks the vast difference in the two situations.

Should we engage in any clandestine intelligence operations in peace time, our needs will certainly be far broader than was the case in South America. They will be less related to operational decisions which can be taken instantly. They will need to get at more fundamental and long-range matters in commercial, scientific, and other areas. The proposal seems to speak in terms of security intelligence alone. This limited view of intelligence has, I think, been in part responsible for many of our failures to estimate situations properly in the past, to find ourselves sometimes on guard against the least of our dangers, and to see dangers on occasion that were out of proportion to the real situation.

Some operation such as that described in the memorandum is already being carried on abroad. It seems to us that before any additional or new activity in this field is encouraged, a considerable amount of planning of a Government-wide kind should be accomplished. As you know, the President directed Secretary Byrnes on September 20 to take the lead in providing for such planning and coordinating on a continuing basis.

DOJ Review Completed.

HS/HC-32

Not referred to OMB. Waiver applies.

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What we should be striving for is a way to build a Government-wide intelligence operation in which all pertinent facilities or resources in every department ~~is~~ utilized and in which the extreme compartmentation and interdepartmental jealousies characteristic of our wartime operation are done away with. } The specific needs of the Government including those of any agency should be determined and operations planned on that basis. Then, too, plans in which the specific operating contribution of each agency is developed, need to be prepared and issued for the guidance of the departments. Neither the Operational Committee nor the Policy Board in the plan you sent me, if I understand their duties, supply this need.

I am informed that the State Department will soon be taking the initial steps to create the interdepartmental committees necessary to begin this long-range job.

Kind personal regards,

Sincerely, .

Assistant Director

Leonard G. Rindberg

Honorable Tom Clark, Esq.
The Attorney General
Department of Justice

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A PLAN FOR U. S. SECRET WORLD-WIDE INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE

Secret world-wide intelligence coverage for the benefit of the United States Government must have as its primary objectives the providing to the executive branches of the Government (1) basic data on a world-wide scale upon which plans may be formulated and action taken, and (2) the insuring of internal security from the threat of infiltrating foreign agents, ideologies, and military conquest. Intelligence coverage must be had immediately. There is no time for training and organizing a new corps.

There is in operation in the Western Hemisphere an intelligence plan based on simplicity of structure and flexibility of operations which has functioned efficiently, secretly, and economically since prior to Pearl Harbor, and has proved its adaptability to world-wide coverage by the effectiveness of its operation in the Western Hemisphere field.

It is proposed that the time-proved program in operation in the Western Hemisphere be extended on a world-wide basis with certain modifications.

The Plan

The plan provides for the joint operation in every country of the world of a service reporting through State Department channels composed of a member from each of the Office of Military Intelligence (military attache), the Office of Naval Intelligence (naval attache), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (legal attache), each as a specialist in his own field and able to operate without a duplication of effort but closely correlating their operations to insure complete coverage.

A committee to control basic policy would be composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and the Attorney General. There would be an operational committee set up by the President composed of an Assistant Secretary of State, the Directors of Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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A unit for evaluation and analysis would be established in the State Department to which the three operating agencies would furnish intelligence data and appropriate review, analysis, and utilization in international matters.

Facility of Operation

The program proposed is somewhat similar in operation as that presently operating in the Western Hemisphere. It has proved its effectiveness, requires no elaborate superstructure and the interested agencies have available trained personnel and operating facilities for recruiting, training, and dispatching additional personnel. The plan, consequently, can be placed in operation immediately by the President merely setting up the policy board, creating the evaluation and analysis section in the State Department and then extending the authority heretofore given to the Directors of Military and Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for operation in the Western Hemisphere to operate on a world-wide basis.

This plan has produced in the Western Hemisphere a maximum amount of information with a minimum of operating personnel and expense, and has not resulted in any embarrassment whatsoever to the United States Government. Its secrecy is assured through the dissemination of the operations among the already existing Government agencies which have previously operated successfully for a long period in their respective fields.

Points for Consideration

Foreign and domestic civil intelligence are inseparable and constitute one field of operation. The German-American Bund and the Italian Fascist organizations in the United States originated and were directed from abroad. The Communist movement originated in Russia but operates in the United States. To follow these organizations access must be had to their origin and headquarters in foreign countries as well as to their activities in the United States. Every major espionage service has operated on a world-wide basis except that of Britain which has had separate organizations for domestic and foreign intelligence, but Britain is in the process at present of consolidating the two services based on their experiences through the war period. In order to cope with the activities of various subversive agents in the United States with speed and dispatch, it is entirely evident that their activities must be followed throughout the various countries by one intelligence agency of the United States Government. Valuable time, as well as efficiency and effectiveness, is lost if one agency covers their activities in Europe, another in Latin America and another in the United States.

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
The theory that police work and intelligence coverage cannot be combined has been entirely dispelled. Police arrests under modern police practice is only one of the important functions of a police agency. In fact, all police work specifically involves the gathering of information in the nature of intelligence. Extensive intelligence coverage must necessarily precede the arrest of the enemy agent in the United States and it is not possible to separate the gathering of intelligence from police functions in view of the numerous criminal statutes such as those relating to espionage and sabotage which must be enforced by police action although directly concerned with intelligence. One of the major factors in the control of subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere during the war was the coordination of efforts of the various police organizations throughout the United States and Latin America through the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

A hazard in intelligence operation is the possibility of a charge being made that the organization is a "Gestapo." Also, a police agency which engages in intelligence operation may be called a "political police." Both charges are obnoxious to American citizens. The set-up operating in the Western Hemisphere throughout the war has engaged in both police and intelligence activities and its record of protecting civil liberties has been highly praised even by the American Civil Liberties Union.

Respectfully,

Attorney General

Copy
10-22-45
ja



The Assistant Director

October 26, 1945

Donald C. Stone

Comments on Proposal "U. S. Secret World-Wide Intelligence Coverage."

This memorandum does not comment upon the question as to whether this country will or will not engage in any clandestine intelligence operations. Also, comment is limited to the proposal as presented. This is more difficult to do than if the plan had been presented in more detail. Other than stating that the plan is similar to that in operation in South America and supplying a chart, the document only contains three paragraphs outlining the plan itself. These three paragraphs provide for a joint operation in every country of the world without stating how joint operation is to be achieved; for a top group to determine basic policy, and for an operational committee, without stating either what basic policy is or what the operational committee would do; and provides a unit for evaluation of material supplied by the three agencies. (Later a reference is made to one agency.)

Certain elements of the proposal and of the arguments in support of it are commented upon favorably:

1. There is a need for a "legal" (or perhaps it would be better referred to as "security") attache'. I have previously commented on this in a memorandum of September 19, a copy of which is attached.
2. Geographic concepts as a basis for delimiting the operations of several agencies in the security intelligence field are not valid.
3. "Police" functions and the collection of a limited kind of intelligence relating to the police function can be combined.

The weaknesses of the proposal as presented are largely those of omission.

1. In using the South American experience as the basis for planning a world-wide system the proposal fails to consider the vast difference between the two situations. In South America, our operations were not directed primarily at the countries in which they were conducted. Our operation there was not secret in the sense that it would have to be in the big league. It was aided greatly by Hemisphere

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defense agreements. Most of the countries were at war as allies. A whole series of actions resulting from our intelligence was possible by agreement (the interning of alien suspects, the Proclaimed List, cooperation of the countries involved in shutting down radios, effecting travel control, etc.). Even under these most favorable conditions, the operation in South America could not be characterized without reserve, as it is in the document, by such phrases as secret, economical, efficient, proved effectiveness, no elaborate superstructure, simplicity of structure, flexibility of operations, assured secrecy, no embarrassment.

2. The plan seems to contemplate the centering under the legal attache' of all undercover agents and liaison with other intelligence agencies. It also apparently envisions no other secret intelligence operation in the Government. The memorandum clearly indicates the limited view of intelligence from which this springs. Security intelligence properly done requires the use of some secret activity. To center all secret intelligence, however, in the security agency would be to inhibit the development of any really basic intelligence and would probably find us in any future emergency again, as at Pearl Harbor, on alert no. 1 (i.e., against sabotage). Daily conferences with the Ambassador under this system would tend to enshroud him in a picture of "threats to democracy" and "intrigue" that would warp his over-all view.
3. The same objection arises from centering coordination in the security agency. The proposal simply adds an Assistant Secretary of State to the present Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee, calls it an Operational Committee, and apparently relies on it for coordination. The present IIC has been a device for securing cooperation in triplication rather for attaining any coordination. Such a committee, working only under basic policy and relying principally on daily meetings in the Embassy, is not an adequate coordinating mechanism. Delimitation by dictionary, i.e., "legal," "military," "naval" will not work. Coordination can only be achieved by the central preparation of detailed operating plans. Coordinating authority should be centered in the interdepartmental committee which the President on September 20 directed Secretary Byrnes to set up. If the current thinking of key persons in this field is any guide to the possible decision of the interdepartmental committee, secret intelligence will not be centered in any one department but will be conducted primarily centrally or under strong central

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direction. The Justice proposal actually would permit FBI to have all responsibility for secret intelligence under only the mildest kind of direction.

Attached is a suggested reply to Mr. Clark. Both this memorandum and the reply to Mr. Clark have been cleared informally with Colonel McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.

Attachments

GFSchwarzwalder:mab -- 10-26-45